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This paper evaluates the impact of large changes in the duration of unemployment 
insurance (UI) in different economic environments on labour supply, job matches, 
and search behaviour. We show that differences in eligibility thresholds by exact 
age give rise to a valid regression discontinuity design, which we implement using 
administrative data on the universe of new unemployment spells and career histo-
ries over twenty years from Germany. We find that increases in UI have small to 
modest effects on non-employment rates, a result robust over the business cycle 
and across demographic groups. Thus, large expansions in UI during recessions do 
not lead to lasting increases in unemployment duration, nor can they explain differ-
ences in unemployment durations across countries. We do not find any effect of 
increased UI duration on average job quality, but show that the mean potentially 
confounds differential effects on job search across the distribution of UI duration. 
However, it appears that for a majority of UI beneficiaries’ increases in UI duration 
may lead to small declines in wages. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Papier wertet den Einfluss von weitreichenden Veränderungen in der Be-
zugsdauer der Arbeitslosenversicherung in verschiedenen ökonomischen Umge-
bungen auf Arbeitsangebot, Qualität der Arbeitsstelle und Suchverhalten aus. Wir 
zeigen, dass Altersbegrenzungen in der Anspruchsberechtigung ein gültiges Re-
gression-Discontinuity-Design erlauben, welches wir mit administrativen Daten auf 
Basis der Grundgesamtheit der Arbeitslosengeldbezieher in Deutschland über 20 
Jahre umsetzen. Wir beobachten, dass Anstiege in der Arbeitslosenversicherung 
kleine bis mäßige Effekte auf die Nichtbeschäftigungsrate haben, ein Ergebnis, das 
robust über den Konjunkturzyklus und verschiedene demografische Gruppen ist. 
Demzufolge führen große Ausweitungen in der Arbeitslosenversicherung während 
Rezessionen weder zu andauernden Anstiegen der Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer, noch 
können sie Unterschiede in der Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer verschiedener Länder erklä-
ren. Wir können keinen Effekt von höherer Arbeitslosengeldbezugsdauer auf die 
durchschnittliche Arbeitsplatzqualität finden, aber zeigen, dass der Durchschnitt 
möglicherweise unterschiedliche Effekte auf die Jobsuche über die Verteilung der 
Arbeitslosengeldbezugsdauer miteinander vermengt. Es scheint jedoch, dass für 
eine Mehrheit der Arbeitslosengeldempfänger eine ansteigende Arbeitslosengeld-
bezugsdauer zu kleinen Abstrichen bei den Gehältern führt. 
JEL classification: J30, J65 
Keywords: Duration of unemployment insurance (UI), regression discontinuity de-
sign 
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An often used policy tool to ease the hardship of job losers in recessions is to ex-
tend the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Extended UI has been a 
prominent feature of downturns in the U.S., with potential duration of UI benefits 
reaching up to two years at the peak of the 2008 recession. Similarly, in many Euro-
pean countries unemployment insurance benefits were raised in the course of the 
1980s to counter increasing unemployment. For example, in Germany unemploy-
ment insurance benefits were increased from 12 to 18-32 months, depending on the 
demographic group. 
The primary goal of these increases is to provide income replacement and prevent 
hardship among unemployment workers. Existing estimates suggest UI benefits 
largely achieve this goal (e.g., Gruber 1997). Yet, there is a longstanding concern 
that the insurance benefit of UI comes at the cost of distorting labour supply incen-
tives. This potential cost of UI may be even greater when recessions involve struc-
tural changes that render part of workers' skills obsolete (Ljungqvist and Sargent 
1998, 2008). In this case the effective replacement rate may rise beyond the typical 
replacement rate and imply stronger effects on labour supply. If skills further depre-
ciate during unemployment, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) show that longer UI 
benefits can lead to lasting increases in unemployment. They argue that such a pat-
tern could explain the divergence in unemployment rates in Germany and the U.S. 
in the early 1980s. A similar mechanism, in a muted form, may apply during down-
turns in the U.S., when both UI durations and structural change may rise considera-
bly. 
Existing estimates indeed point to non-negligible effects of increased UI benefits 
and UI durations on non-employment spells (e.g., Krueger and Meyer 2002), al-
though the interpretation of these estimates as pure moral hazard effects has re-
cently been questioned (Chetty 2008). In either case, the magnitude of existing es-
timates does not imply substantial increases in unemployment as a result from 
longer UI durations (e.g., Katz and Meyer 1990), and this has been taken to mean 
that differences in UI regimes are unlikely to explain unemployment differentials ac-
ross countries (e.g., Hunt 1995). However, most existing estimates are based on 
expansions of UI insurance at relatively short durations and job loss during relatively 
mild recessions. It may be that the effect of extended UI during larger downturns 
differs. Yet, this hypothesis is difficult to test, since usually extension in UI durations 
occur in conjunction with important changes in the economic environment. 
Next to providing income support, a second key goal of UI is to aid workers to find 
higher quality jobs. In fact, a core prediction from the standard workhorse model of 
job search is that extended UI allows workers to find a better job match. However, 
much less is known about this aspect of UI (e.g., Krueger and Meyer 2002). Existing 
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estimates point to a negligible effect of UI on wages.
1 This is a puzzle with respect 
to the standard search model, and instead points to search at constant wages. Al-
ternatively, it may suggest offsetting effects of match improvement and human capi-
tal depreciation over the unemployment spell. The welfare and policy implications of 
alternative implications clearly differ. Understanding the effect of UI duration on job 
search is thus important. However, it requires analysis of the full dynamic response 
of wages and employment to UI expansions, something difficult to do in conven-
tional data sets. 
In this paper we evaluate the full impact of extended UI duration during different 
labour market states on both non-employment durations and job matching. We ex-
ploit differences in the UI duration for different age groups under multiple policy re-
gimes in Germany, leading to sharp increases in UI eligibility by age. We show that 
these differences lead to a valid regression discontinuity design of the effect of UI 
duration on non-employment, wages, and other labour market outcomes. We im-
plement this approach using detailed administrative data on the universe of unem-
ployment spells and ensuing job outcomes in Germany from the mid-1980s to the 
present. 
This research design allows us to estimate labour supply elasticites with respect to 
UI durations in Germany for large differential expansions, and compare these to 
findings in the United States.
2 We find that labour supply elasticities are moderate 
and at the lower end of U.S. estimates. They are somewhat larger than results in 
Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), which use a comparable research design based on 
Austrian data.
3 Our elasticities are similar for different increases in UI duration, and 
similar to estimates based on much smaller increases. This suggests that long ex-
pansions in UI durations such as extended UI do not have a larger effect on labour 
supply, and cannot explain persistent differences in unemployment in Germany and 
the United States. 
We then exploit the fact that our regression discontinuity design implies a situation 
close to the ideal experiment for comparing differences in unemployment regimes 
on unemployment during difficult economic times. By comparing workers just above 
and below our age cut offs in periods with a high and low degree of structural 
change, we can assess the effect of changes in generosity of UI during different 
                                                  
1   This is found in a recent study by Card, Chetty, Weber (2007), and also appears in earlier 
studies (see, e.g., Meyer 2002) 
2   Hunt (1995) estimated labour supply effects of the German UI system in a difference in 
difference framework. We show below that our results indicate smaller labour supply ef-
fects. 
3   Our elasticities are smaller than in Lalive (2008) who estimated the effects of extended UI 
in Austria using a regression discontinuity design in Austria on a sample of older workers. 
This difference may partly stem from interactions with early retirement decisions, and 
thus may be misleading for understanding the labour supply effects among younger 
workers. We estimate treatment effects for different age groups, some of whom are very 
unlikely to be affected by early retirement. economic environments. Furthermore exploiting variation in the degree of sector-
specific changes vis-à-vis the economy wide state of labour demand also allows us 
to control for differences in the overall arrival rate of jobs. This closely approximates 
the ideal experiment implicit in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). The results point to 
negligible differences in the effect of UI across more turbulent or tranquil times. 
Based on our findings, there is no reason to believe that the adverse incentive of UI 
is stronger in recessions. 
Our third main finding concerns the question of the effect of UI duration on job 
search. On the one hand, we do not find a beneficial effect of increased UI duration 
for any of the job outcomes we consider on average. On the other hand, we do find 
that the wage of UI beneficiaries steeply declines with duration, even though there 
seems to be no appreciable difference in any worker characteristic. This suggests 
that wages do decline with benefit duration above and beyond selection of workers. 
When we implement our regression discontinuity estimates at each point of potential 
UI duration, we find that workers at shorter duration may experience a small nega-
tive effect on the wage. Workers exhausting their benefits on the other hand experi-
ence a clear increase in wages. However, this increase is partly offset in the aver-
age by a clear drop when the new, higher threshold is reached. 
Overall, our results imply that even long durations of extended UI are unlikely to 
significantly contribute to a rise in unemployment or differences in unemployment 
across countries. Conversely, reductions in UI duration are unlikely to appreciably 
reduce unemployment. We also confirm that on average increased UI duration has 
no beneficial effects on job search outcomes. However, our analysis of the dynamic 
pattern of unemployment durations and wages draw a more nuanced view of the 
effect of UI duration on job search. While workers exiting at short durations experi-
ence a net decline in wages, perhaps due to depreciation in human capital, those 
exhausting their benefits appear to raise their reservation wages. However, whether 
this increase leads to an increase in accepted wages of workers exiting at the 
threshold is doubtful. 
We contribute to several aspects of the literature on the effect of UI on employment 
and job outcomes of UI beneficiaries. First, we obtain new, precise estimates of the 
labour supply elasticities based on larger increases in UI durations. This comple-
ments existing studies mainly focusing on smaller increases at lower levels of dura-
tion. It also revises existing estimates for Germany downwards, bringing them closer 
in line to U.S. results. Second, we replicate our regression discontinuity estimates 
for different economic regimes to assess whether extended UI can have counter-
productive effects in larger recessions. Contrary to predictions from differences in 
replacement rates driven by technological restructuring, we do not find that either 
duration effects or corresponding elasticities vary appreciably with the state of the 
industry or labour market. Third, our paper is one of the few studies thoroughly ex-
amining the effect of UI duration on job search behaviour. Our analysis of both aver-
age effects and the dynamic response of duration and wages suggests that match 
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effects are at best quite small and concentrated on the subset of workers exhausting 
their benefits. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we give a brief introduction of the 
main questions surrounding the evaluation of UI insurance that sets the stage for 
the further analysis. In section 3 we describe our administrative data and the institu-
tional environment in Germany. Section 4 briefly reviews our empirical approach. 
Section 5 and 6 contain our main findings regarding the effect of extended UI on 
labour supply and job search outcomes, respectively. Section 7 offers preliminary 
conclusions. 
2  The effect of unemployment insurance duration on labour 
supply and wages 
The main predictions for the effect of changes in the duration of UI on labour supply 
are typically derived from a model of job search (e.g., Mortensen 1977). Yet, the 
main predictions are similar in a static model of labour supply (Moffitt and Nicholson 
1982). In the standard search model, a worker receiving UI benefits will decrease 
the reservation wage and raise search intensity in the course of the UI spell as 
benefits start to run out. Thus, the escape rate from unemployment increases with 
the UI spell, whereas accepted wages decline. An increase in the potential duration 
of UI benefits leads workers to lower their search intensity and raise their reserva-
tion wage initially, thereby increasing the duration of unemployment. A similar disin-
centive effect occurs in the static labour supply model. In that model, workers can 
find a job anytime at the market wage, but face a trade-off between consumption 
and leisure. The presence of UI benefits affects the slope of the budget constraint 
until the point of benefit exhaustion. As in the search model, an extension of UI 
benefits lowers labour supply of UI beneficiaries.
4 
A long literature has estimated the effect of changes in the duration and generosity 
of UI benefits on duration of non-employment. The majority of these studies are 
identified by changes in benefit duration or replacement rates within U.S. states 
(e.g., Moffitt 1985, Meyer 1990, Katz and Meyer 1990a, b, Card and Levine 2000). 
Overall, the range of estimates indicate that the effect of benefit duration on labour 
supply is modest to small (e.g., Krueger and Meyer 2002). Certainly, these findings 
do not imply strong effects of small to modest increases in UI durations on the dura-
tion of non-employment spells. However, most estimates are typically based on mid-
                                                  
4   The search model also predicts the so-called 'entitlement effect', according to which in-
creased and longer benefits raise the value of reemployment towards the end of a benefit 
spell (or for a worker that is not entitled to benefits). This leads workers to intensify their 
search effort and lower their reservation wage further towards the end of the benefit pe-
riod. Simulations in Mortensen (1977) suggest that under reasonable parameter values 
both effects should lead the escape rate to increase towards the end of the UI spell. A 
similar effect can occur in the static labour supply model since a broader range of people 
will maximize their benefits at the kink point in the budget constraint (Moffitt and Nichols 
1982). dle sized increases in benefit durations, with the larger changes usually being about 
2-3 months. Thus, it is difficult to infer from these studies the effect of more drastic 
increases in benefit durations, as often occurring in times of high unemployment. 
This may be worrisome, since a recent extension of this literature has suggested 
that disincentive effects may be particularly strong in large recessions involving a 
high amount of structural change. The argument is cast by Sargent and Ljungqvist 
(1998) in an elaborate search model, but the point can be understood using the 
static model of labour supply. Benefits are set based on previous wage levels, but 
the work decision is based on the wage rate prevailing after job loss. Thus, effective 
replacement rates can be much higher than the average replacement rate. Thus, if 
workers experience a drop in demand for their industry or occupation specific skills, 
non-employment durations are likely to increase more than predicted by the average 
replacement rate. Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998) show that this can lead to lasting 
increases in unemployment if skill depreciates during the unemployment spell. If 
disincentives so increase in 'turbulent' times, the estimates from average time peri-
ods will underestimate the potential effect of benefit duration on labour supply. 
In another recent extension the literature, Chetty (2008) has instead argued that 
existing estimates will overestimate the disincentive effect of UI durations on labour 
supply if workers are credit constraint. In this case, the estimated labour supply 
elasticity will capture both the substitution and the income effect from increased UI 
durations. Distinguishing between the two effects matters, since it affects optimal 
determination of benefit parameters. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) provide evi-
dence that job losers respond similarly to lump-sum severance pay and increases in 
UI durations, consistent with the presence of credit constraints. This evidence sug-
gests that already modest existing estimates may imply even lower disincentive ef-
fects. 
Although the primary goal of UI is income insurance, a secondary goal is the sub-
sidy of job search. The potential benefit of longer UI durations is immediately appar-
ent in the standard search model with variable wages. The longer workers wait be-
fore accepting a job, the higher the likelihood of obtaining a good draw from the 
wage offer distribution. The fact that existing estimates do not point to a positive 
effect of longer UI durations on wages suggests that search may be modelled as a 
function of search intensity only (Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007). In this case, non-
employment durations are predicted to increase with benefit durations, but wages 
are assumed to be flat. The observed decline in wages with elapsed benefit duration 
is then entirely attributed to worker heterogeneity. This model is a natural extension 
of the static labour supply model to a dynamic setting. Thus, the welfare benefits 
from increased UI durations primarily derive through increased leisure and reduced 
costs from job search. 
In a more standard search model with variable wages, the welfare benefit from in-
creased UI would also arise from obtaining a better job match. The model has a 
richer set of predictions for the search process; in particular, now there are multiple 
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reasons why wages can fall over the unemployment spell other than heterogeneity, 
such as reductions in reservation wages, depreciation in human capital, or stigma 
effects. There is ample empirical evidence that the quality of jobs differs even for 
workers with the same characteristics. It is thus a puzzle that changes in search 
intensity and changes in UI durations do not appear to affect the wage. 
Distinguishing between these two cases is important for assessing whether and how 
UI affects job search. Moreover, the welfare effect of UI depends on the effects of 
job search on wage outcomes. 
3  Institutional background and data 
3.1  The unemployment insurance system in Germany 
This section describes the features of the German unemployment insurance system 
from the 1980s until the early 2000s.
5 In our empirical analysis we exploit various 
changes in the system during this time period. We therefore first describe the sys-
tem as it existed until 1984 and then explain how the system changed in later years. 
A worker is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits (UIB – Arbeits-
losengeld in German) if he worked for at least 12 months in the previous 3 years 
(called the base period). The potential duration for receiving UIB depends on the 
number of months worked in the base period and can go up to 12 months. UI bene-
fits are 68 percent of the last net wage of the worker and not means tested.
6 After UI 
benefits are exhausted an unemployed worker may receive unemployment assis-
tance benefits (UA - Arbeitslosenhilfe in German), which is 58 percent of previous 
net income, however, unlike UIB, other sources of income (such as spouses income 
or income from financial assets) are subtracted. Furthermore the receipt of UA is 
means tested and a person may have to wait if considered too wealthy. There is no 
maximum duration for UA receipt and cases are reviewed once a year. 
Workers are barred from receiving unemployment benefits if they quit without good 
cause or are fired for misconduct. Furthermore after a period of 4 months of UIB 
recipiency they can be sanctioned for not accepting job offers. The penalty is loss of 
benefits of up to 12 months, but the sanctions appear to be rarely enforced (Wilke 
2004). 
Germany's unemployment insurance system saw a major reform in each of the last 
three decades. Between 1984 and 1987 the unemployment insurance system was 
subjected to several gradual changes. In 1984 UI benefit and UA replacement rates 
were lowered for individuals without children. The UIB replacement rate for this 
group decreased from 68 percent to 63 percent, while the UA replacement rate de-
                                                  
5   The discussion here draws on Hunt (1995), Arntz et al. (2007), and Fitzenberger and 
Wilke (2009) as well as our own reading of the law (Sozialgesetzbuch III) 
6   According to Hunt (1995) a cap on the amount one may receive exists but only affects 
about 1 percent of the recipients. IAB-Discussion Paper 4/2010  11 
creased from 58 to 53 percent. Over the next three years the potential UI durations 
for older workers with high experience levels were expanded substantially. For ex-
ample, for workers age 42 to 43 the maximum rose to 18 months by 1988. For 
workers age 44 to 49 to 22 months and for 50 to 54 to 26 months. The complete 
mapping from experience during the base period, the age of the worker and the time 
of the beginning of the unemployment spell can be found in Table 1. Potential UI 
duration is determined by the age of the worker on the day she starts receiving UI 
benefits. Thus there are quite sharp discontinuities in potential durations at several 
age cut-offs, especially for workers with high labour force attachment who are eligi-
ble to the maximum UI durations. For these workers, Figure 1 shows the variation of 
UI durations with age during different time periods. The discontinuities in this func-
tion are the basis for our regression discontinuity estimates. 
The system remained fairly stable from 1988 until March 1997, except for a slight 
decrease in the replacement rates in 1994 (see Table 1). Then in April 1997 the 
potential UI durations were lowered for older individuals. However the reform was 
phased in gradually, so that for most people it only took effect in April 1999 (see 
Arntz, Simon Lo, and Wilke 2007). The main change in this reform was that the age 
requirements required to qualify for the higher potential UI durations increased by 3 
years. Furthermore stricter sanction rules for individual who did not comply with eli-
gibility rules were introduced (see Boone et al. 2002, 2004). 
Starting in 2003 a major round of reforms of the social security system came into 
effect, the so called Hartz reforms. The first three reforms (Hartz I-III) implemented 
on January 1st, 2003 (Hartz I and II) and January 1st, 2004 (Hartz III) focused on 
the organisational structure of the public employment services and on active labour 
market policies (such as training and wage subsidy programs).
7 The last reform 
(Hartz IV) took effect on January 1st, 2005 and overhauled the UI insurance system. 
The main changes were the merge of AU with the general social assistance (wel-
fare) system, which made payments unrelated to previous earnings and purely 
means tested, and a change in potential ALG durations. 
3.2  Data 
The data for this paper is the universe of social security records in Germany. Be-
tween 1975 and 2008, we observe for the entire population of Germany every em-
ployment spell in a job that is covered by social security and every spell of receiving 
unemployment insurance benefits. Individual workers can be followed using a 
unique person ID and since about 80 percent of all jobs are within the social security 
system (the main exceptions are self-employed and government employees) this 
results in nearly complete work histories for the vast majority of individuals. Com-
pared to many other social security datasets, this data is very detailed and we ob-
                                                  
7   See Jacobi and Kluve (2007) for a detailed description and summary of evaluations of 
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serve several demographic characteristics, namely gender, education, birth date, 
nationality, place of residence and work, as well as detailed job characteristics, such 
as average daily wage, occupation, industry, exact start and end date for each job. 
We also know exactly when a person received unemployment insurance benefits 
(ALG) or unemployment assistance (ALH) and how much. Each employment record 
also has a unique establishment identifier and various establishment characteristics 
can thus be merged to individual spells. On the establishment level we can identify 
plant closings and mass lay-offs.
8 Overall this dataset covers a total of about 1 bil-
lion employment and unemployment spells and about 24 million workers per year. 
The focus of this paper is the analysis of unemployment spells. Thus we created our 
analysis sample by selecting all unemployment spells in this data, about 36 million. 
For each unemployment spell we created variables about the previous work history 
(such as tenure, experience, wage, industry and occupation at the previous job), the 
duration of the receiving UI benefits, the level of unemployment benefits, and infor-
mation about the next job held after unemployment. We do not directly observe 
whether individuals are unemployed, but instead know whether they receive UI or 
unemployment assistance (ALH), whether they are in registered employment, or 
neither of the two. As a proxy for unemployment durations we use the duration of 
non-employment, which is measured as the time between the start of receiving UI 
benefits and the date of the next registered employment spell. This may overstate 
actual non-employment durations if some individuals become self-employed. Since 
some people take many years until returning to registered employment while other 
never do so, we cap non-employment durations at 36 months and set the duration of 
all longer spells at this cap. Our results are very robust to the exact choice of the 
cap. 
The main 'treatment' variable we are interested in is the maximum potential duration 
of unemployment insurance benefits. This is not directly available in the data so we 
use information about the law in the relevant time periods and our detailed informa-
tion on the work history of the individuals to impute the potential duration. This impu-
tation works very well for workers who have been employed for a long continuous 
time for whom the rules are very clear. However, the imputation is not as clear cut 
for workers with intermittent unemployment spells. We thus define our core analysis 
sample to be all unemployment spells of workers who have been working for at least 
6 of the last 7 years and never received unemployment insurance during that time. 
In this sample all workers are eligible to the maximum potential durations for their 
age groups. 
                                                  
8   See Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender (2009) for an analysis of earnings losses due 
to mass lay-offs based on the same data. IAB-Discussion Paper 4/2010  13 
4  Methodology 
A crucial parameter for policy makers is the labour supply elasticity with respect to 
features of the unemployment insurance system, such as potential benefit durations 
and replacement ratios. To obtain an estimate for this elasticity, estimates of the 
causal effect of changes in these features are required. We obtain such estimates 
for subgroups of the population using a regression discontinuity design which ex-
ploits age discontinuities in potential unemployment benefit durations. For our main 
results we focus on the relatively long period between July 1987 and March 1999 
during which the system remained largely unchanged.
9 As described above, during 
this period there are particularly sharp discontinuities for workers with the highest 
experience rating. 
We estimate variants of the following regression model: 
yia = β0 + β1Da≥a* + f(a) + εai, 
where yia is an outcome variable, such as non-employment duration, of an individual 
i of age a. Da≥a* is a dummy variable that indicates that an individual is above the 
age threshold a*. We focus on the three sharp thresholds in our sample at age 42, 
44 and 49.
10 The standard RD assumption is that all factors that influence the out-
come variable, other than the treatment variable, vary continuously with the forcing 
variable, which is age in our case, around the threshold. If this assumption holds 
then estimates for β1can be interpreted as the causal effect of an increase in poten-
tial durations on the outcome variable, since the flexible continuous function f(a) 
captures the influence of all other variables. 
One possibility would be to estimate equation 1 with three Indicators, one for each 
age threshold, and to specify f(a) as a global polynomial. The second possibility that 
has become standard in the literature is to estimate equation 1 locally around the 
cut-offs and to specify f(a) as a linear function while allowing different slopes on both 
sides of the cut-off. One can then reduce the bandwidth around the cut-off to assess 
the validity of the RD design, since smaller bandwidths should reduce the bias of the 
estimator, however at the cost of efficiency. We present our results using the sec-
ond approach, which in using observations close to the cut-off is generally consid-
ered closer in spirit to the RD identifying assumption that treatment is assigned as 
good as random close to the cut-off. However in practice this does not matter very 
much and the main results are all apparent from the graphical evidence that we pre-
sent as well. 
                                                  
9   As explained above the 1997 reform did not come into effect for the high experience 
workers until April 1999. 
10  There is a 4th discontinuity during this threshold is at age 54. Since at this age early re-
tirement becomes very common and various policies to facilitate early retirement interact 
with the UI system we focus on younger workers in this paper. Early retirement in the 
context of the German UI system has been analyzed for example in Fitzenberger and 
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It is possible to include other control variables in the RD regressions, in hope to in-
crease the efficiency of the estimates. It turns out that for most of the outcomes we 
consider, in particular unemployment and non-employment durations, other vari-
ables in our dataset have little explanatory power (partly because we estimate our 
model on a relatively homogenous sample of workers). The efficiency gain from this 
is very small, so that we prefer to present the raw estimates without controlling for 
additional variables. 
An important potential threat to the RD identification exists if individuals have direct 
control over the forcing variable. If this is the case the individuals who choose spe-
cific values of the forcing variable may well be different from individuals choosing 
other values. Since they may take the cut-offs into consideration this may lead to a 
violation of the continuity assumption crucial for identification in the RD setting. In 
our setting both the employer who lays off workers as well as the individual have 
some influence on the timing of job loss and the claiming of unemployment benefits. 
There are two reasons why this may lead to a bias in our setting: on the one hand 
employers may prefer to layoff workers who have longer potential benefit durations, 
perhaps feeling that it is less costly for them. If situations where this is possible differ 
systematically from other situations, then workers to the left of the cut-off may be 
systematically different from workers to the right of it. In this case, however, there 
should be breaks in the density of unemployment spells around the age cut-offs 
- something that can easily be tested for.
11 Furthermore we test whether other pre-
determined variables vary smoothly around the cut-offs. 
The other reason for systematic differences of workers along the forcing variable is 
that workers can decide on the day on which they first claim unemployment benefits. 
A worker who becomes unemployed a few days before her 42nd birthday may have 
a significant incentive to delay claiming unemployment insurance until her birthday, 
depending on her discount rate and expected unemployment duration (roughly 25 
percent of the unemployed just below age 42 exhaust their 12 months ALG dura-
tions).
12 
While this incentive may be sizeable for workers very close to the cut-off, it very 
quickly declines further away from the cut-off. The reason is that by delaying the 
unemployment benefit claim the worker gives up benefits she would receive with 
certainty for an increase in benefits she may only receive in case she is unemployed 
                                                  
11 The density test may fail to detect violations of the RD assumptions, if some employers 
prefer to lay off high potential benefit duration workers while others prefer to do the oppo-
site -  perhaps because they dislike generous UI insurance  -, thus counteracting the 
change in the density. This seems unlikely to us. Furthermore if this were the case and 
would lead to systematic differences in worker characteristics, it should also show up as 
discontinuities in other baseline variables at the cut-offs - something we test for. 
12 This is not as far fetched as it may sound. From conversations with an unemployment 
agency employee we learned that at least in recent year’s case workers at the agencies 
are supposed to make unemployed workers aware of the possibility to delay their claims 
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for a very large time. Workers (close to the age 42 cut-off) who delay claiming and 
then find a job within the next 12 months lose all the benefits they could have re-
ceived during the delay time. Furthermore a month of delay means the loss of the 
full unemployment benefit amount, while the increase in potential durations means 
that during that time workers receive ALG payments but may otherwise have re-
ceived ALH payments. The precise calculation depends of a number of factors, such 
as the discount rate, but our sense of this is that, delaying claiming should only be a 
relevant option for workers within a few weeks of their birthdays. Since in our data 
we observe the last date of employment as well as the day of claiming UI benefits it 
is easy to test whether the duration between end of the job and claiming UI benefits 
increases close to the age cut-offs. Furthermore density tests as well as tests for 
smoothness of other variables allow to investigate whether this may lead to a poten-
tial bias.
13 
5  Elasticity results 
5.1  The effect of UI durations on non-employment durations 
Figure 2 (a) shows how the duration of receiving UI varies with the age at the begin-
ning of the unemployment spell. Workers younger than 42 at the age of claiming UI, 
are eligible to 12 months UI of which they use about 6.5 months on average. At the 
age 42 threshold UI eligibility increases to 18 months and the average duration or UI 
receipt increases to about 8.2 months. There are also clear and large increases at 
the age 44 and age 49 cut-offs. The increase in receipt duration are quite large, and 
range from one fourth (at the age 44 cut-off) to one third (at the age 49 cut-off) of 
the increase in the maximum UI durations. This indicates that a large number of 
individuals are quite substantially affected by the increase in UI. 
The increases in actual UI durations at the cut-offs are a combination of two effects. 
On the one hand individuals who otherwise would have exhausted their UI benefits, 
but would have remained unemployed, continue receiving UI benefits under the 
more generous system. On the other hand individuals respond to more generous UI 
benefits by remaining unemployed longer. 
To isolate the behavioural effect of extended UI, Figure 2 (b) shows the effect on 
non-employment durations and thus the main outcome variable of our analysis. 
There is a clear jump in non-employment durations at the age 42 cut-off from about 
14.7 to 15.5 months of non-employment. At age 44, non-employment durations in-
                                                  
13  If this kind of delaying were prevalent one could still get valid RD estimates using a 'fuzzy' 
RD design, where the age at layoff is used as the forcing variable rather than the age of 
claiming UI (assuming that the age at layoff is not manipulated by workers or employers). 
The age of layoff can then be used to instrument for the treatment variable. Since the du-
ration between end of job and claiming UI is non-negligible, the relationship between po-
tential UI durations and age at job loss is somewhat noisy, which is why we prefer the 
regular RD design over the fuzzy one without evidence that the type of sorting is actually 
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crease from 15.5 to 16 months and at age 49 from 18 to 18.4. Thus while some of 
the increase in durations of UI receipt are due to longer coverage of individuals 
would have been unemployed anyways, there is also a substantial behavioural re-
sponse. 
Regression results for estimating equation 1 for these outcome variables are shown 
in Table  3. The results are very consistent with the graphical analysis when we 
choose a bandwidth of 2 years for the local linear regressions. For smaller band-
widths coefficients are extremely stable for the UI duration regressions, even with 
bandwidths as small as 0.5 or 0.2 years. For the non-employment durations they are 
also in the same ballpark across different bandwidths, but somewhat larger for 
tighter bandwidths. From investigating figures with different bandwidths it is clear 
that this is due to undersmoothing for the smaller bandwidths. Note that 2 years is 
already a very narrow bandwidth in comparison to other papers, for example   
Lemieux and Milligan (2008) use a bandwidth of 6 years. We thus have most confi-
dence in estimates with 2 year bandwidths.
14 
Focusing on the 2 year bandwidth results: at the age 42 cut-off non-employment 
durations increase by 0.8 months (standard error 0.1 months) which corresponds to 
an elasticity of about 0.14.
15 At age 44 the increase is 0.45 months and at age 49 
the increase 0.4 months. Strikingly despite the fact that the increases in UI occur at 
very different levels of non-employment and UI durations, the implied elasticities are 
nearly the same for the different cut-offs (0.14, 0.14, and 0.13). This may indicate 
that the elasticity (rather than the marginal effect) is the right statistic to extrapolate 
the effect to other settings. 
Our non-employment duration variable includes individuals who never return to em-
ployment. Thus the increase in non-employment durations could be partly due to 
people staying out of employment forever, rather than taking longer until returning to 
a job. In order to investigate this Table 4 column (4) shows the probability of ever 
returning to registered employment again. There is a slight drop at the age 42 cut-
off: individuals above the cut-off have a 0.6 percent lower probability of ever return-
ing to work again. This therefore accounts for a very small increase in the non-
employment durations. For the other cut-offs the effect is of the same magnitude but 
less precisely estimated and thus statistically insignificant. Furthermore there is no 
statistically significant effect on being employed five years after the start of UI.
16 
                                                  
14  There is another age discontinuity at age 50 in the eligibility for early retirement. We 
therefore only use observations between 49 and 50 for estimates of the effect of the age 
49 discontinuity, while still using a two year window to the right of the 49 cut-off. 
15  This is calculated as an increase in non-employment durations of 0.83 months over an 
average non-employment duration around the cut-off of 15 months relative to an increase 
of 6 months over average potential UI durations of 15 months. 
16  This refers to the employment status on the day 5 years after the start of UI. This is natu-
rally a noisier measure for future labour market participation than whether someone ever 
returns to employment, which explains the larger standard error on this coefficient. There is a slightly positive effect of being on unemployment insurance or unem-
ployment assistance five years after the start of UI for the 42 and 44 age cut-off. 
These could be either individuals who are still on unemployment assistance (which 
is unlimited) or indicative of matching effects - a possibility to which we will return 
later. Again this effect is very small though, with a 0.5 percent higher probability of 
being on UI or UA and standard errors tight enough to rule out much larger effects. 
Given the small magnitudes of these effects it certainly does not seem like there are 
strong permanent employment effects. 
It is interesting to compare our results with previous research on the German UI 
system. In particular Hunt (1995) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2009) evaluate the 
Germany UI system in the 1980s and 1990s using a difference in difference ap-
proach, comparing the change in non-employment durations for different age groups 
before and after the reforms in the 1980s. For this approach these papers pool age 
groups of workers and assume that changes over time are due to the differential 
increase in UI durations for these age groups. It is important to note that both pa-
pers focus more on the older age groups, which may account for some of the differ-
ences. 
Compared to Hunt (1995) we find smaller non-employment elasticities. We believe 
the main reason for this difference is the age gradient in non-employment durations, 
which was revealed in Figure 2. For example between age 44 and 49 non-
employment durations increase from 16 to 18 months. A simple difference estimator 
comparing the 42-44 age group with the 44 to 49 age group would therefore con-
clude that the difference in UI eligibility of 4 months increases non-employment du-
rations by 1.5 months (from 15.5 to 17) which is much larger than our RD estimate 
of 0.45 months at the 44 threshold. Hunt (1995) uses a difference in difference esti-
mator, which attempts to control for the age gradient by taking the baseline age gra-
dient (in the Pre 1984 period) into account, where there was no difference in UI eli-
gibility across the age groups. This approach may of course fail if there are differen-
tial time trends for the treatment and control groups. When we replicated our analy-
sis for the Pre 1984 period we found that there was no age gradient in non-
employment durations. 
Thus the difference in difference estimator picks up the increase in the age gradient 
and interprets this as an increase due to the change in the UI system. This could be 
valid if we had only one RD estimate which might pick up a local treatment effect 
and the treatment effect would vary with age. However, we find nearly the same 
elasticity across all three age cut-offs, making this highly unlikely. It thus seems that 
there were other reasons for the increase in the age gradients, such as early retire-
ment plans, which lead to an upward bias in Hunt's (1995) estimates. 
Fitzenberger and Wilke's (2009) main findings concern the age groups older than 
50, which we excluded from our analysis. As Hunt (1995), Fitzenberger and Wilke 
use a difference in difference estimator, which may therefore in principle have simi-
IAB-Discussion Paper 4/2010  17 IAB-Discussion Paper 4/2010  18 
lar problems. Their main finding is a strong increase in spells that never return to 
employment. In Figure 6 we show that there is a strong age gradient in the probabil-
ity of ever returning to work but no jump at the UI discontinuities. It appears there-
fore that a difference in difference estimator would again falsely attribute this to the 
increase in the gradient to the UI changes. The comparison with these difference in 
difference studies is certainly interesting and clearly shows the potential threats to 
identification inherent in the difference in difference approach. (See also Lemieux 
and Milligan 2007 for a similar comparison). 
Lalive (2008) evaluates the effects of UI in Austria in a similar regression discontinu-
ity design. He finds that an increase of benefit durations from 30 to 209 weeks for 
workers age 50 increases unemployment durations for men from 13 to 28 weeks. 
This corresponds to an elasticity of 0.48 and is thus substantially larger than our 
elasticity of 0.14.
17 As a rescaled marginal effect however the effect is smaller than 
our finding: we find that at the age 42 cut-off one additional month of UI increases 
durations by 0.14 months, while Lalive's results imply an increase in 0.9 months. 
This shows an inherent problem with this kind of reduced form analysis: the esti-
mated parameters are reduced form parameters without a clear connection to a 
deep structural parameter. To compare such parameters across studies with differ-
ent treatments requires an extrapolation of what one parameter estimate estimated 
for one treatment would imply for the treatment in another study. Such an extrapola-
tion necessarily requires functional form assumptions (such as implicit when choos-
ing to compare the marginal effect or the elasticity), which are difficult to justify. This 
is a clear advantage of structural modelling which provides clear guidelines how to 
extrapolate results to other settings, a point to which we are planning to come back 
to in the structural part.
18 
5.2  Identification assumptions 
The identification assumption of the regression discontinuity design requires that, 
except for the treatment variable, all factors influencing the outcome variable vary 
continuously at the points of discontinuity. This assumption can be tested for ob-
servable characteristics, both by plotting the observables vs. the forcing variable 
and by estimating equation 1 with the observables as outcome variables. Table 5 
                                                  
17  The formula we use (see notes of Table 2) may be considered inappropriate for such 
very large changes in UI durations. Instead one could assume that the relationship be-
tween unemployment durations and UI durations is given by a constant elasticity function. 
Such a function has the form y = ax
b, where b is the elasticity. For one treatment effect 
estimate the implied elasticity is then: b = [log (UnempDur1) – log (UnempDur2)] / log 
(PotDur1) – log (PotDur2). Calculating elasticities this way does not affect our elasticities 
very much (about 0.137 rather than 0.139) and reduces Lalive's elasticity from 0.48 to 
0.39. Thus while this does matter for large changes in potential durations this elasticity is 
still much larger than ours. 
18  Lalive (2008) shows that the extended UI Program in Austria had important interactions 
with early retirement decisions, which may explain part of the differences in the effects 
which we find. presents results of these regressions. Of the 24 coefficients in Table 5, there are 
only two statistically significant on the 5 percent level. There is a slight increase in 
education at the 42 year threshold. However this increase and the statistically sig-
nificant jump in the fraction female at the age 49 cut-off are quite small (1.6 per-
cent). 
A second standard way of testing the RD assumption is to look at the smoothness of 
the density around the cut-offs. This can be assessed visually and a formal test has 
been developed by McCrary (2008). Figure 3 (a) shows the number of spells in 2 
week age intervals. On average there are around 3000 spells in each bin up until 
age 47, after which the number of spells begin to decrease. It appears that at each 
cut-off there is a slight increase in the density in the bin directly on the right of the 
cut-off. Implementing the McCrary test, this increase is statistically significant on the 
5 percent level for the 42 and 49 cut-off but of very small magnitude.  
Such an increase could either occur because firms are more likely to lay off worker 
with higher potential UI durations, because of a higher probability of claiming UI, or 
because workers wait until their birthdays before claiming UI benefits (as explained 
in the previous section). To test for the first possibility we show the density of spells 
with respect of the dates the last job prior to UI ended in Figure 3 (b). If firms either 
are more likely to lay off workers with higher UI benefits, the discontinuity should 
appear in this figure as well. Again there appear to be slight outliers right to the right 
of the 42 and 49 cut-offs, but less clearly as in Figure 3 (a). If anything this would 
indicate that firms may wait for a short time to lay off workers until they are eligible to 
higher UI benefit levels. It does not appear that firms are systematically more likely 
to lay off workers with higher levels of UI benefits, since in this case the density 
would permanently shift up. 
To see whether workers wait before claiming UI until they are eligible for extended 
UI durations. To test for this we check whether the time between job loss and first 
take up of UI benefits varies around the threshold. The regressions are reported in 
Table 3, column (3). These provide no indication that people who claim UI to the 
right of the threshold have waited longer before claiming than the people to the left 
of it. From the density plots this result is probably not surprising, since if anything 
the average increase in the duration until claiming would be very small, as we only 
found a change in the density right around the cut-off. The duration measure is sim-
ply too noisy to pick this up. Given the economics incentives it makes sense that 
only individuals very close to the age cut-off would decide to wait until their birthday. 
For example given the estimates in Table 3 an individual at the age 42 cut-off can 
expect to receive UI for about 1.7 months longer if they are eligible to 18 rather than 
12 months. The economic cost of delaying the claim is that the individual does not 
receive UI until claim and if the individual would not exhaust the 12 month benefits, 
this would be without benefit in the future. So even ignoring the possibility of receiv-
ing UA after the end of UI and assuming zero discounting, there seems to be no 
incentive to wait longer than 1.7 months for the higher benefit durations. 
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Essentially it appears that the discontinuity in the density is driven by maximally a 
few hundred spells shifted to the right just around the cut-offs. It should be noted 
that this is relative to around 300,000 spells in each of the 4 year intervals that we 
use for our RD estimation.
19 Since the magnitude of this effect is very small (in par-
ticular relative to our non-employment results) and there are essentially no disconti-
nuities in other variables we do not think this is a big threat to the validity of our main 
estimates. As a robustness check we estimated all of our main results excluding 
observations within one month of the cut-offs in Panel B of Table 4. This has virtu-
ally no effect on the magnitude of the coefficient at age 42 and a very small effect on 
the other two coefficients. Furthermore we estimated our main specifications con-
trolling for observables, and again obtained virtually the same coefficients.
20 
5.3  Interpretation and reverse experiment 
The overall magnitude of our estimates of the labour supply elasticities with respect 
of UI duration are quite comparable to similar elasticities found in the United States 
(e.g., Meyer 1990, Katz and Meyer 1990, Card and Levine 2000). They are lower 
than those reported by Hunt (1995) for Germany, and in the ballpark of results in 
Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007). This is an important finding since our estimates are 
based on much larger increases in unemployment durations than in these previous 
papers. As noted by Moffitt (1985), it is in difficult economic times when large exten-
sions in UI take place and are likely to matter most. 
These relatively low elasticities imply that changes in the duration of UI benefits do 
not have a large effect on unemployment durations and hence on the unemployment 
rate. As a result, all else equal, periods of extended UI would not be predicted to 
substantially raise the duration of non-employment. This calculation misses an effect 
on the inflow rate into unemployment, but our discussion above suggests the impact 
of extended UI duration on entries into unemployment in Germany is small at best.
21 
The conclusion might be different for the United States, where UI has been found to 
increase layoff rates through incomplete experience rating. However, by the time 
extended UI is typically enacted, most of layoffs are likely to have already occurred. 
By the same token, reforms of the UI system that reduce benefit durations are not 
predicted to have a substantial effect on non-employment duration or on unemploy-
ment rates. In 1997 Germany reformed its UI system, substantially reducing the 
                                                  
19  In smaller datasets this effect would almost certainly not be detectable. 
20  It is interesting to note that the density discontinuities are larger for the 1999 to 2004 
sample (see Appendix). This is consistent with the fact that unemployment agency case-
workers were advised in recent years to make UI claimants aware of the possibility to de-
lay UI claiming to be eligible for longer potential durations. However the discontinuity is 
still very small relative to the overall number of spells and does not seem large enough to 
be a threat to RD estimation for this sample. 
21  Most of the positive effect of UI on layoff rates in the United States has been attributed to 
the presence of experience rating (e.g., see Table 2.3 in Krueger and Meyer 2002). Since 
there is no experience rating in the German unemployment system, so the result of no ef-
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length of benefit durations for some groups of workers. Part of the intended effect 
was to reduce unemployment durations. Figure 4 shows the regression discontinuity 
effect on non-employment durations comparable to Figure 2, but for the new, post-
1997 regime.
22 The figure shows that the discontinuities in non-employment dura-
tions move to the new age thresholds. This confirms that the assumption implicit in 
our analysis of the discontinuities at the pre-1997 age thresholds is valid. Table 6 
shows that the elasticities are now smaller than what was shown in Table 3, al-
though they are still similar across age-groups. From Figure 4 it is also apparent that 
the duration of the average unemployment spell decreased for each age. On the 
one hand, this is due to stricter monitoring of job search behaviour and penalties for 
not accepting suitable jobs. On the other hand, it may be partly due to an increased 
in incidence of short-term low wage jobs. As we will see next, the differences are 
unlikely to be due to changes in the economic environment in the labour market. 
5.4  Variation of labour supply effects with the business cycle 
Katz and Meyer (1990) and Hunt (1995) concluded that variation in the generosity of 
UI is unlikely to explain the substantial differences in elapsed unemployment dura-
tion in the US and Germany. Since the elasticities we report are lower than theirs, 
our findings confirm this conclusion. The average duration of uncompleted non-
employment spells in Table 2 is 19 months for workers with high labour force at-
tachment. The duration of non-employment spells in the U.S. is substantially lower 
- more on the order of magnitude of 4-5 months.
23 However, according to Table 3 
(column 3) an increase in UI duration of six months leads to an increase in non-
employment of only about one month for all age groups. 
This comparison makes important simplifications among several dimensions. Per-
haps most importantly, it makes no statement about the effect of continued income 
assistance through unemployment assistance (ALH), which may well account for 
part of the remaining difference (however, Hunt (1995) reports that few workers 
switch from unemployment insurance to ALH).
24 Yet, the main criticism has been 
that large increases in non-employment durations due to differences in generosity of 
UI should arise mainly in periods of increased structural change (Sargent and 
Ljungqvist 1998). 
To try and assess this prediction, we can use the fact that Germany has gone 
through a dramatic boom-bust period after unification, plus an ensuing protracted 
                                                  
22  For the high experience workers that we focus on the reform did not come into effect until 
April 1999. Therefore when we speak of our post-1997 reform results we refer to a sam-
ple of individuals starting UI between April 1999 and December 2004. 
23  Finding an exact counterpart to the numbers in Table 2 is difficult, since a comparable 
sample would include only unemployed individuals with high attachment to the labour 
force. 
24  On the other hand, the elasticity at the worker level might overstate the effect at the mac-
roeconomic level, since increased duration for workers covered by UI may imply lower 
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slump. The first panel of Figure 5 plots elasticities obtained by replicating our re-
gression discontinuity estimates separately for each calendar year and age group. 
The figure has two messages. First, the range of elasticities for 42 year olds is be-
tween 0.1 and 0.4. The range is the same for 44 year olds; elasticities are substan-
tially more variable, somewhat smaller, and declining over time for 49 year olds (not 
shown). Second, it is apparent that there is no systematic variation with any aspect 
of the business cycle of the elasticities. The latter pattern can also be seen clearly 
from the second panel of Figure 5, where we plot the elasticities for all ages against 
the unemployment rates. In fact, if we were to exclude age 49, the relationship 
would be negative. 
These findings are summarized and extended in Table 8, where we extend the re-
sults from Figure 5 (b). First, we show that the main finding holds when we use dif-
ferent indicators of the change in labour market conditions, including the annual 
mass-layoff and plant closing rate, which we calculated from our data.
25,26 
Second, in the bottom panel we show changes in labour supply elasticities for work-
ers losing their jobs in industries with high or low average wage losses (as meas-
ured by quintiles). The average wage loss may be a better measure of the amount 
of specific skill a worker is likely to lose. Moreover, we can then control for a poten-
tial confounding effect from changes in overall labour demand by either adding the 
rate of unemployment or year effects. The results are pretty unequivocal - there is 
no difference in elasticity with the predicted wage change. 
Table 9 shows estimates of the discontinuities for the three age-thresholds for peri-
ods of increasing and declining unemployment. The table confirms the results from 
the figure. While at 42 and 44 the elasticities decline with increases in unemploy-
ment, they appear to rise for 49 year olds. In separate results, we also found that 
these pattern hold for the level and the change in unemployment rates, as well as 
for the annual incidence of mass-layoffs and plant closings. 
These findings are similar to results reported in Moffitt (1985). Using administrative 
data from 13 states covering information on unemployment spells begun between 
1978-1980, Moffitt (1985) finds that the disincentive effect of UI declines with the 
level of unemployment rate. A negative relationship can arise since low arrival rates 
imply that parameters of the UI benefits system have smaller effects on the probabil-
ity of finding a job. Thus, a potential criticism of our measure of 'turbulence' is that it 
                                                  
25  In fact, if we regress the elasticities weighted by the inverse of their standard error on a 
constant, the resulting mean-squared error is the test-statistic for a standard Chi-Squared 
goodness of fit test. If we assume estimates for the elasticities are asymptotically nor-
mally distributed, the mean-squared error is asymptotically Chi-Squared distributed with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of elasticities in the regression minus the num-
ber of regressors. 
26  See Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender (2009) for information on how these rates are 
calculated in the German data. does not capture incidence when workers are likely to lose a higher amount of, say, 
industry specific skills, but when the arrival rate is low. This effect will work counter a 
potential increase in moral hazard. 
Part of this criticism is taken care of by the fact that the elasticities implicitly account 
for a worsening state of the labour market since they normalize by the average dura-
tion. In fact, this implies that the coefficient estimates (normalized by the increase in 
potential benefit duration) should be positively correlated with our indicators of the 
state of the labour market. This is true, yet the positive correlation is still weak. This 
is because the average unemployment duration is only weakly procyclical. 
5.5  Differences by gender 
We explored differences in our findings among several subgroups. The differences 
we found were typically relatively small. The most telling and pervasive difference 
was with respect to gender. This is shown in Table 7. First, perhaps not surprisingly, 
the effect of increases in potential benefit duration leads to a bigger effect on actual 
benefit receipt for women. This effect does translate to only slightly higher elastic-
ities of non-employment duration, implying a stronger effect on labour force partici-
pation. This is born out by the fact that women experience an increase in the prob-
ability of being on UI and a decline in the probability of working 5 years after the 
beginning of the initial spell. For men, on the other hand, the effect on employment 
or UI receipt five years later is a pretty clean zero. Second, women also experience 
a larger decline in wages at reemployment significant at the 10 % level, at least for 
the 42 and 49 year olds. For men, the point estimates are less than half and very 
imprecisely estimated, even though the sample size is double that of women. 
We also tried various other sample splits, including differences by education, job 
tenure, and tenure in a given industry or occupation, most of which yielded incon-
clusive results. The only difference worth noting is for workers with high job tenure, 
shown in Table 8. As expected, these workers have higher elasticities of actual UI 
benefit receipt and of non-employment durations at all ages. They also are less 
likely to be ever employed again. There is no difference in wage losses, though this 
may be partly driven by selection. Overall, considering the fact that estimated elas-
ticities and match effects do not vary substantially across age groups, across the 
size of the expansion in potential UI benefits, or the state of the business cycle, we 
interpret our findings to imply very stable small to moderate effects on labour supply 
and no effects on average match quality. 
6  UI expansions and job matching: Average and dynamic 
effects 
6.1  Average effects 
If there is no skill depreciation during an unemployment spell (or stigmatization of 
the long term unemployed), then the standard search model with stochastic wages 
predicts that the wage at the accepted job improves with the generosity of the un-
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tions. Only if wages are not stochastic, so individuals' only choice variable is search 
intensity, would the standard search model predict a zero wage effect. 
On the other hand if there is skill depreciation, or stigmatization, the job quality after 
unemployment may decrease with longer potential benefit durations. Table 10 tests 
whether longer potential benefit durations increase post unemployment wages. 
There appears to be no effect of potential durations either on the post unemploy-
ment wage or on the wage change between relative to the previous wage. The 
graphical (Figure 6) analysis supports this conclusion. If anything there is a slightly 
negative effect of longer durations on post wages. 
We have also analyzed the effect of increases in potential UI durations on a range 
of other outcomes, shown Table 10 and Figure 6. At most age-thresholds and for 
most variables we consider, the effect is small and insignificant. In particular, we do 
not find an effect on wages five years after the start of the UI spell, suggesting 
workers do not take initially lower paying jobs because of high growth potential. 
Similarly, it does not appear that workers experience wage increases over time. We 
also do not find any robust effects on the incidence of industry or occupation 
changes. More time to search does not lead workers to be more likely to find a job in 
their occupation or industry. 
6.2  Changes in the dynamics of exits 
The analysis so far focused on effects on the mean. However, the effect may be 
quite different for different parts of the distribution. For example it may be that a 
large fraction of unemployed individuals search very intensely for jobs and find jobs 
in a short period of time, like a month or two. The search behaviour of this group 
may not be affected by whether or not they can continue to receive unemployment 
benefits after the 12 month period. Similarly workers who have extremely high ex-
pected unemployment durations may not be affected very much. 
Figure 7 provides a way of looking at how the distribution of unemployment dura-
tions changes at the age cut-off by providing nonparametric estimates of the survival 
functions just before and just after the cut-off using regression discontinuity esti-
mates. RD estimates for the survival functions are created by estimating the follow-
ing equation: 
P(Dur≥x)ia = β0,x + β1,xDa≥a* + f(a) + εai 
This equation is the same as the main RD estimation equation, except for the differ-
ence that in the regression the left hand side variable is a dummy for the duration 
being longer than x  months, where we estimate this for x=1,...,25. Since F(x) = 
P(Dur≥ x) is the survival function, the estimates for β1,x are estimates for the shift of 
the survival function at the discontinuity, while β0,x  are estimates for the survival 
function just to the left of the cut-off (with the right normalization of the age variable). 
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Figure 7 (a) shows the results for duration of UI benefit receipt. The survival function 
for individuals eligible to 18 months of UI relative to individuals eligible to 12 months 
is already clearly shifted outward around 3-4 months after the beginning of UI. Thus 
unemployed individuals adjust their search behaviour a long time before running out 
of UI depending on whether they are eligible to longer durations. This clearly rejects 
the hypothesis that individuals are myopic and only affected at the point where they 
actually run out of UI benefits. Mechanically the survival functions drop almost to 
zero at the end of UI eligibility.
27 
The figure also reveals that about 28 percent exhaust their UI benefits in the 12 
month eligibility group, while only about 20 percent in the 18 month eligibility group. 
The limits in UI are thus clearly binding for a large fraction of individuals in both 
groups. 
Similarly, Figure 7 (b) shows that the probability of remaining in non-employment 
also increases along the entire duration distribution. It is therefore not the case that 
the majority of workers exit non-employment right when UI runs out and that this 
point is shifted outwards. Rather, when UI durations are increased workers' search 
behaviour is affected at all points in time, thus shifting out the distribution. 
Figure 8 shows the corresponding hazard functions, also based on regression dis-
continuity estimates, separately for men and women. For men the hazard rate of 
leaving non-employment declines from about 0.12 in the first 4 months to less than 
0.04. In addition, consistent with previous studies (e.g. Meyer 1990 and Card, 
Chetty, and Weber 2007) there are clear spikes in the hazard rate at the benefit ex-
haustion points for the two respective groups. The figure also confirms our finding 
that job finding rates for individuals with 18 months of UI eligibility are lower as early 
as 3 months after the beginning of the UI spell. This is reversed around month 15, 
when individuals under the more general UI regime have higher hazard rates. For 
women the shape of the hazard function is much flatter initially while of a similar 
level after about 6 months. The spikes in the hazard rate at the end of UI eligibility 
are nearly twice as big as for men, which is consistent with the larger mean duration 
effect that we found for women. 
In Table 11 Panel A provides regression discontinuity estimates of the change in the 
escape hazard rates along the duration distribution for all age discontinuities. For all 
discontinuities, there is a clear decrease in the escape hazard for the higher UI eli-
gibility group in the last month of UI for the lower UI eligibility group. This drop in the 
hazard is mirrored by an increase in the last UI month of the higher UI eligibility 
group. The table also shows that the hazard rate is lower for the higher UI eligibility 
group before UI runs out for the lower group at each cut-off. This clearly confirms 
the forward looking behaviour of the unemployed. Furthermore column (1) shows 
                                                  
27  The reason that a few individuals have UI durations longer than the maximum may be 
due to interruptions (but not due to employment) of receiving UI benefits. that the escape hazard over the first 12 months decreases at each of the disconti-
nuities, even when potential UI durations increase from 22 to 26 months, the hazard 
rate over the first 12 months falls by 1.4 percent, suggesting that individuals are for-
ward looking over quite a long time horizon. 
6.3  Changes in the dynamics of wages 
Figure 9 shows how wage losses vary with non-employment durations for individu-
als under different UI regimes. The figure shows the average wage loss in Euro of 
individuals accepting jobs conditional on the month (since the start of UI) in which 
they exit. The figure shows separate line for different age groups from our main RD 
estimations by UI eligibility. The timing is such that month 0 refers to individuals exit-
ing within the first month of receiving UI. The vertical lines are in month 12, 18, 22, 
and 26, the maximum UI durations for the 4 groups. Individuals exiting in month 12 
in the 40-41 age group are thus exiting within the 4 week period after they run out of 
UI benefits.  
Two results are apparent from the figure. First, wages decline on average during a 
non-employment spell. The decline is similar across age-groups until month 20, af-
ter which older workers begin experiencing stronger reductions in wages. This de-
cline in wages after a job loss is not matched by a corresponding decline of 'pre-
dicted' wages, i.e., wages predicted based on workers' gender, education, job, in-
dustry, and occupation tenure, and the prior wage. In other words, there is literally 
no corresponding change in observable worker heterogeneity with non-employment 
duration. Thus, the decline in average wages is unlikely to be driven by selection; 
instead, it is consistent with a decline in reservation wages as the non-employment 
spell progresses. Note that for reasonable parameter values the search model pre-
dicts reservation wages should start to decline towards the end of the UI spell, 
whereas here they are falling throughout. 
The second noteworthy feature of the figure is that wages show a clear drop at the 
exhaustion point relevant for the respective age group. This pattern is predicted by a 
standard search model, as workers are eager to return to employment as UI runs 
out to regain eligibility for future UI use. A spike in job finding at benefit exhaustion is 
often found, and is sometimes called the 'entitlement' effect. The longer the potential 
duration of UI, the more attractive is a return to employment, the larger should be 
the spike - something clearly borne out in the figure. We also see a slight flattening 
of the wage gradient after the exhaustion point, as predicted by a search model. 
However, the wage decline continues, suggesting that something else is going on, 
such as human capital depreciation. Alternatively, the same effect through reserva-
tion wages is continuing since some workers might be on ALH. 
Figure 9 may provide a biased estimate of the effect of potential UI durations on the 
accepted wage duration profile if there is an age gradient in the wage profile. For 
this reason Figure 10 (a) provides RD estimates of the change in the wage loss pro-
file. This is created using the same method as for estimating the change in the sur-
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loss of workers exiting in a given month. By lining up the RD estimates for each exit 
month one receives an estimate for how this function changes at the discontinuity 
(and thus an estimate of the causal effect of UI on the shape of this function). The 
figure shows the variation for the age 42 cut-off, the cleanest of the discontinuities. 
The vertical bars between the lines indicate that the difference is statistically signifi-
cant (5 percent level). 
Figure 10 (a) suggests several key findings. First, wages for the treatment and con-
trol groups are very similar for workers exiting in the first 11 months of the non-
employment spell. Below, we will see that on average wages tend to decline for 
these workers. Second, there is a clear drop in earnings for the control group at the 
exhaustion of benefits at 12 months. Third, there is a similarly sized drop in earnings 
for the control at the new exhaustion point. These patterns are robust to different 
ways of implementing the RD, measuring wages, or controlling for observables. 
Table 11 Panel B and C provide regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of 
increased UI eligibility on wages during different months of exiting unemployment. 
The regressions confirm the result from the figure, that despite the clear decrease in 
the exit hazards over the first 12 months of non-employment at each increase in UI 
eligibility, there is no clear corresponding change in mean accepted wages: in Panel 
A Column (1) the age 49 coefficient is negative, but this is not significant in Panel B 
where the log wage change is the outcome variable. Similarly in the log wage 
change specification there is a positive effect at the age 44 cut-off, which is however 
not significant for the mean post wages in Panel B. Given this discrepancy across 
the two specifications, we interpret this as no evidence for systematic changes in 
the wage-non-employment duration relationship at those discontinuities. The wage 
dips at the benefit exhaustion point are still clearly visible for the age 42 cut-off for 
both specifications. There are no corresponding dips at the 44 and 49 cut-off, but 
this may just be due to statistical power, since the respective confidence intervals 
cover dips of the 42 cut-off magnitude.  
As argued above, the standard search model with reservation wages can explain 
the dip and the shift in the dip as the exhaustion point changes. This dip is the coun-
terpart to commonly observed increases in the job finding rate at that point. How-
ever, the model cannot explain why wages of UI recipients with longer durations are 
similar or even smaller than that of workers with shorter duration. In the basic model, 
the reservation wage path should increase with potential UI duration at all points of 
the unemployment spell until benefits run out. The fact that the reservation wage 
path does not rise, and perhaps even declines, with increased potential duration 
may indicate human capital depreciation or stigma effects are present. These ef-
fects should increase with spell duration, yet this is not borne out with the figure. 
This confounds two factors: workers may change their reservation wage in each 
month since the start of UI, thus affecting the accepted wage path and the composi-
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loss conditional on month of exit does not necessarily mean that for a specific 
worker the wage loss changed but instead could reflect that they are exiting in a 
different month. If the policy change increases durations by shifting individuals to 
longer durations and this shift is monotonically increasing with duration, then the 
rank ordering of individuals does not change. For example the individuals in the 5th 
percentile under both policy regimes would be comparable groups. 
Under this strong assumption, one can estimate how wage losses affect subgroups 
of individuals at different intervals of non-employment duration. For Figure 10 (b) we 
break up all individuals below the age 42 cut-off into 20 quantile intervals (i.e. indi-
viduals in the 0th to 4th percentile, 5th to 9th, ...) of the non-employment duration 
distribution of these individuals. The individuals above the threshold are divided into 
the quantiles of their respective employment distribution. Under the assumption that 
the policy does not affect this rank ordering, the individuals in the same quantiles 
across age groups are comparable and we can investigate wage losses within each 
of these quantile groups. In Figure 10 (b) we show how log wage losses vary with 
duration quantiles using the same RD methodology as for Figure 10 (a). 
Figure 10 (b) clarifies that there may be a decline in wages at lower non-employ-
ment durations. It also shows that if constrained workers retain their same rank, they 
are predicted to experience an increase in accepted wages. However, given that we 
observe a spike of similar magnitude at the new exhaustion point, it is likely that the 
rank assumption is violated. 
Overall, we conclude that workers are clearly forward looking in the job search deci-
sions, and that both reservation wages and search intensity are likely to play a role 
in the job search process. Our findings also suggest that the average wage effect 
hides complex dynamics occurring over the job spell. It appears that both search 
intensity and reservation wages are differentially affected across the non-employ-
ment spell. However, the patterns can only partly be explained by a basic model of 
on the job search. 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have evaluated the impact of large changes in the duration of un-
employment insurance (UI) on labour supply, the quality of job matches, and job 
search behaviour. We show that differences in eligibility thresholds by exact age 
give rise to a valid regression discontinuity design, which we implement using ad-
ministrative data on the universe of new unemployment spells and career histories 
over twenty years from Germany. The German UI system gives rise to multiple age-
thresholds that have changed over time, leading to multiple quasi-experiments. We 
use these to assess two unresolved hypotheses about UI. First, disincentive effects 
may be worse in recessions when the effective replacement rate rises for many 
workers due to a loss in skills. Second, it is still an open question whether in addition 
to subsidizing income UI allows workers to obtain better job matches. 
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are modest to low. They are in the lower range of estimates from the U.S. (Krueger 
and Meyer 2002), lower than some previous estimates for Germany (Hunt 1995), 
but similar to recent results for Austria from a similar research design (Card, Chetty, 
and Weber 2007). This suggests that even large increases in UI durations - such as 
typically occurring in the U.S. as UI is extended for up to two years in larger reces-
sions - do not have a different impact than the smaller increases typically analyzed 
in the existing literature. 
We also find that labour supply elasticities are very robust over time and across 
groups of workers. In particular, they do not vary strongly with the state of the busi-
ness cycle or the average industry-specific wage loss holding the business cycle 
constant. At best, for workers in middle-age elasticities appear to decline somewhat 
with increases in the unemployment rate. Overall, our results indicate that exten-
sions in UI during large recessions are unlikely to lead to a sizable or lasting in-
crease in unemployment durations. Similarly, differences in the generosity of UI 
across countries are unlikely to explain a majority of large observed differences in 
the duration of unemployment spells.  
While we find adverse effects on labour supply, we do not find effects on average 
outcomes of job search. Our regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of UI 
extensions on wages, wage growth, long-term employment outcomes, or the prob-
ability of switching industry or occupation are all zero. These results are consistent 
with an earlier literature and recent findings by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) that 
match effects of UI insurance appear to be small. This points to a world were search 
occurs through variation in search intensity and at constant wages. However, these 
findings represent a puzzle for the standard search model and a vast literature 
demonstrating that similar workers get paid different wages. 
Our findings from the effect of UI expansions on the dynamics of employment and 
wages over the UI spell draw a more nuanced view of job search, and confirm some 
predictions of the search model with variable wages. The hazard of job finding be-
gins to decline prior to benefit exhaustion, consistent with a decline in search inten-
sity. Similarly, we find a weak decline in wages for this group. We also find an in-
crease in job finding and a steep drop in wages close to the exhaustion point. 
As duration is expanded, the spike in job finding rates and wages shifts to the new 
threshold. Whether the accepted wage actually increases for the workers con-
strained by the benefit exhaustion is doubtful, however, since we observe a similar 
spike again at the new exhaustion point. On average, for the majority of workers 
induced to stay on UI longer the wage effects are at best negative. 
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Table 1 
Potential unemployment insurance benefit (ALG) durations as a function of age and 
months worked in previous 7 years 
Months  
worked 
in previous  
7 years 
January  





















2005 -  
December 
2007 
12   4   4   4   6   6   6  
16   4   4   4   8   8   8  
18   6   6   6   8   8   8  
20   6   6   6   10   10   10  
24   8   8   8   12   12   12  
28   8   8   8   14 (≥42)   14 (≥45)   12  
30   10   10   10   14 (≥42)   14 (≥45)   15 (≥55)  
32   10   10   10   16 (≥42)   16 (≥45)   15 (≥55)  
36   12   12   12   18 (≥42)   18 (≥45)   18 (≥55)  
40   12   12   12   20 (≥44)   20 (≥47)   18 (≥55)  
42   12   14 (≥49)   14 (≥44)   20 (≥44)   20 (≥47)   18 (≥55)  
44   12   14 (≥49)   14 (≥44)   22 (≥44)   22 (≥47)   18 (≥55)  
48   12   16 (≥49)   16 (≥44)   24 (≥49)   24 (≥52)   18 (≥55)  
52   12   16 (≥49)   16 (≥44)   26 (≥49)   26 (≥52)   18 (≥55)  
54   12   18 (≥49)   18 (≥49)   26 (≥49)   26 (≥52)   18 (≥55)  
56   12   18 (≥49)   18 (≥49)   28 (≥54)   28 (≥57)   18 (≥55)  
60   12   18 (≥49)   20 (≥49)   30 (≥54)   30 (≥57)   18 (≥55)  
64   12   18 (≥49)   20 (≥49)   32 (≥54)   32 (≥57)   18 (≥55)  
66   12   18 (≥49)   22 (≥54)   32 (≥54)   32 (≥57)   18 (≥55)  
72   12   18 (≥49)   24 (≥54)   32 (≥54)   32 (≥57)   18 (≥55)  
Replacement rates on gross wages in percent: 
ALG (children)   68   68   68   67
‡   67   67  
ALG (no children)  63
†   63   63   60
‡   60   60  
ALH (children)   58   58   58   57
‡   57   57  
ALH (no children)  53
†   53   53   50
‡   50   50  
*   The reform in 1997 was phased in gradually: For workers who had worked for more than one year during the 
three years before April 1997, the old rules applied until March 1999 (see Arntz, Simon Lo, and Wilke 2007). 
†  ALG and ALH replacement rates were lowered starting in January 1984. Until December 1983, ALG was 68 
percent and ALH 58 percent of the previous gross wage, irrespective of whether the recipient had children. 
‡  ALG and ALH were lowered starting in January of 1994. 
Source:   Hunt (1995) and Bundesgesetzblatt (1983-2008). 
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Means and standard deviations of main variables 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
  All UI spells 
1975 - 2004 
All UI spells 
July 1987 -
March 1999 
As column (2) 
but only spells  
with max UI dur
* 
As column (3)
but only age 
40 to 44  
Panel A: UI Variables 
Maximum ALG Duration (imputed)       17.1   15.0  
      [5.8]   [3.0]  
Duration of ALG receipt in months   5.9   7.2   9.1   8.0  
  [5.6]   [6.7]   [8.1]   [6.3]  
Non-employment duration in months   13.3   17.2   19.1   19.0  
  [24.9]   [26.4]   [29.6]   [28.8]  
Time from end of job until start of ALG   1.5   1.51   1.8   1.6  
  [7.1]   [7.0]   [5.6]   [5.4]  
Daily Wage Post Unemployment Wage in Euro  52.4   52.9   66.3   67.4  
  [28.0]   [26.8]   [31.5]   [32.2]  
Post Wage - Pre Wage in Euro   -4.7   -4.2   -13.5   -13.9  
  [26.3]   [26.8]   [28.8]   [28.6]  
Log(Post Wage) - Log(Pre Wage)   -0.15   -0.11   -0.27   -0.26  
  [0.74]   [0.58]   [0.63]   [0.60]  
Switch Industry after Unemployment   0.61   0.65   0.75   0.76  
  [0.49]   [0.48]   [0.44]   [0.43]  
Switch Occupation after Unemployment   0.55   0.59   0.65   0.66  
  [0.50]   [0.49]   [0.48]   [0.47]  
Post Unemp. Spell: Is in fulltime Employment   0.68   0.73   0.71   0.75  
  [0.47]   [0.45]   [0.45]   [0.44]  
Post Unemp. Spell: Has any Employment   0.88   0.90   0.83   0.86  
  [0.33]   [0.30]   [0.38]   [0.35]  
   
Panel B: Demographic Variables 
Last Wage prior to UE   58.2   59.7   80.8   82.4  
  [29.2]   [29.6]   [29.7]   [30.6]  
Education years   10.8   10.9   11.0   11.1  
  [2.2]   [2.3]   [2.3]   [2.4]  
Fraction female   0.40   0.45   0.35   0.35  
  [0.49]   [0.50]   [0.48]   [0.48]  
Fraction non-german  0.19   0.078   0.12   0.13  
  [0.39]   [0.27]   [0.32]   [0.34]  
Pre Unemployment experience in years   7.1   6.3   13.3   14.1  
  [5.8]   [5.6]   [4.1]   [4.0]  
Pre Unemp occupation tenure in years   3.7   3.4   9.2   9.6  
  [4.7]   [4.5]   [5.3]   [5.5]  
Pre Unemp industry tenure in years   2.7   3.1   9.0   9.3  
 [3.87]    [4.4]    [5.5]   [5.7]  
Employment size of previous establishment   678   821   1049   897  
  [1950]   [2070]   [3078]   [2686]  
Number of Spells   36784166  11544815   974360   156565  
Notes: Mean of main variables, standard deviations in brackets. Wages are in prices of 2000.  
* Individuals who worked for 52 months in the previous 7 years without intermittent spell of receiving UI benefits. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of ALG duration on months of  
ALG receipt and non-employment 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
  Age bandwidth around age discontinuity 
  2 years   1 year   0.5 years   0.2 years 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Duration of ALG receipt 
D(age>=42)   1.73   1.79   1.68   1.64  
 [0.043]**  [0.061]**  [0.081]**  [0.12]** 
Elasticity   0.58   0.60   0.57   0.55  
Observations   311252   155306   77333   31215  
D(age>=44)   1.02   1.11   1.04   1.29  
 [0.053]**  [0.074]**  [0.10]**    [0.17]** 
Elasticity   0.55   0.60   0.56   0.70  
Observations   310140   155253   77626   31106  
D(age>=49)   1.37   1.40   1.45   1.74  
 [0.087]**  [0.099]**  [0.14]**    [0.20]** 
Elasticity   0.69   0.71   0.74   0.89  
Observations   220837   144977   72665   29121  
Panel B: Dependent variable: Non-employment duration 
D(age>=42)   0.83   0.98   1.08   0.86  
  [0.10]**   [0.15]**   [0.20]**   [0.32]** 
Elasticity   0.14   0.16   0.18   0.15  
Observations   311252   155306   77333   31215  
D(age>=44)   0.45   0.63   0.62   0.95  
  [0.10]**   [0.14]**   [0.21]**   [0.35]** 
Elasticity   0.14   0.20   0.20   0.30  
Observations   310140   155253   77626   31106  
D(age>=49)   0.40   0.53   0.62   0.95  
  [0.14]**   [0.16]**   [0.22]**   [0.35]** 
Elasticity   0.13   0.18   0.21   0.32  
Observations   220837   144977   72665   29121  
Notes:   Each coefficient from separate RD regressions. Local linear regressions with differ-
ent slopes on each side of cut-off. Standard errors clustered (in parentheses) on 
day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).  
  At the age 42 discontinuity UI benefit durations (ALG) increase from 12 to 18 months, 
at the age 44 discontinuity from 18 to 22 months and at the age 49 discontinuity from 
22 to 26 months. The elasticity is calculated as: (RD Coefficient / Change Potential 
Durations) × (Average Pot. Dur. Around cut-off / Average Aa Dur around Cut-off). 
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987 
and March 1999, who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without intermit-
tent UI spell. For the age 49 cut-off and bandwidth 2 years column, the regression 
only includes individuals 47 and older and younger than 50, due to the early retire-
ment discontinuity at age 50. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of potential ALG duration on employ-
ment outcomes 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  













Panel A: All observations 
D(age>=42)  1.73   0.83   -0.031   -0.0058   -0.0017   0.0056  
 [0.046]**  [0.10]**    [0.044]   [0.0023]* [0.0035]    [0.0025]* 
Observations  311252   311252   311252   311252   311252   311252  
D(age>=44)  1.02   0.45   0.021   -0.0039   -0.0062   0.0059  
  [0.053]**  [0.10]**   [0.040]   [0.0024]   [0.0035]   [0.0027]* 
Observations  310140   310140   310140   310140   310140   310140  
D(age>=49)  1.37   0.40   0.030   -0.0049   -0.0018   0.0047  
  [0.087]**  [0.14]**   [0.046]   [0.0039]   [0.0047]   [0.0036]  
Observations  220837   220837   220837   220837   220837   220837  
Panel B: Excluding observations within 1 month of discontinuity 
D(age>=42)  1.75   0.83   -0.036   -0.0063   -0.0032   0.0055  
 [0.047]**  [0.11]**    [0.047]   [0.0025]* [0.0038]    [0.0027]* 
Observations  298317   298317   298317   298317   298317   298317  
D(age>=44)  0.99   0.38   0.024   -0.0036   -0.0030   0.0040  
  [0.058]**  [0.11]**   [0.044]   [0.0027]   [0.0037]   [0.0029]  
Observations  297196   297196   297196   297196   297196   297196  
D(age>=49)  1.30   0.33   0.033   -0.0062   -0.0032   0.0072  
  [0.11]**   [0.16]*   [0.055]   [0.0047]   [0.0055]   [0.0042]  
Observations  208594   208594   208594   208594   208594   208594  
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each 
side of cut-off. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01). 
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987  
and March 1999, who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent 
UI spell. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of smoothness of predetermined variables 
around age discontinuities 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  
  Years of 









Last Job   Pre Wage 
Panel A: All observations 
D(age>=42)  0.037   0.0061   0.0040   0.014   0.0062   0.035   0.059   0.37  
  [0.018]*   [0.0034]   [0.0023]  [0.039]   [0.037]   [0.038]   [0.040]   [0.23]  
Observations  311252   311252   311252   311252   311252   311252   311252   303446 
D(age>=44)  -0.012   0.0028   0.0014   0.053   0.011   0.025   0.061   -0.024  
  [0.017]   [0.0034]   [0.0025]  [0.041]   [0.041]   [0.041]   [0.044]   [0.23]  
Observations  310140   310140   310140   310140   310140   310140   310140   302272 
D(age>=49)  0.021   0.016   0.0013   0.013   -0.034   -0.029   0.032   0.051  
  [0.019]   [0.0046]* [0.0035]  [0.058]   [0.051]   [0.056]   [0.054]   [0.29]  
Observations  220837   220837   220837   220837   220837   220837   220837   214311 
Panel B: Excluding observations within 1 month of discontinuity 
D(age>=42)  0.024   0.0055   0.0037   0.020   0.036   0.052   0.061   0.20  
  [0.020]   [0.0037]   [0.0026]  [0.042]   [0.041]   [0.042]   [0.043]   [0.24]  
Observations  298317   298317   298317   298317   298317   298317   298317   290832 
D(age>=44)  -0.020   0.0021   0.0014   0.053   0.0030   0.014   0.065   -0.21  
  [0.018]   [0.0037]   [0.0027]  [0.045]   [0.044]   [0.045]   [0.047]   [0.24]  
Observations  297196   297196   297196   297196   297196   297196   297196   289629 
D(age>=49)  0.010   0.012   0.0012   -0.018   -0.056   -0.066   -0.0013   -0.28  
  [0.021]   [0.0050]* [0.0040]  [0.067]   [0.060]   [0.063]   [0.062]   [0.35]  
Observations  208594   208594   208594   208594   208594   208594   208594   202443 
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of cut-
off. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01). 
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987 and March 
1999, who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of potential ALG – post 1997 reform 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  






















Panel A: All observations 
D(age>=45)  1.66   0.53   -0.16   -0.0030  -0.93   -0.61   0.32   -0.0024   -0.0016 
 [0.047]**  [0.11]**    [0.064]*  [0.0029] [0.29]**  [0.35]    [0.26]   [0.0038]   [0.0017] 
Elasticity   0.58   0.095   -0.25   -0.0088 0.14   -0.028    0.011    -0.019   -0.094  
Observations  239394    239394    239394 239394 163322 166115 234218 239394    239394 
D(age>=47)  0.94   0.26   -0.017   0.0018  -0.40   -0.65   0.028   0.0032   -0.00035 
 [0.061]**  [0.11]*    [0.068]  [0.0031]  [0.31]   [0.35]   [0.28]   [0.0038]   [0.0018] 
Elasticity   0.53   0.086   -0.053   0.011   0.11   -0.061   0.0019  0.050   -0.037  
Observations  231477    231477    231477 231477 152752 155338 226314 231477    231477 
Panel B: Excluding observations within 1 month of discontinuity 
D(age>=45)  1.66   0.46   -0.18   -0.00097  -0.93   -0.70   0.15   -0.00019   -0.0015 
 [0.052]**  [0.12]**    [0.067]** [0.0032] [0.32]**  [0.38]    [0.29]   [0.0041]   [0.0018] 
Elasticity   0.58   0.083   -0.27   -0.0029 0.14   -0.032    0.0050  -0.0015   -0.089  
Observations  229371    229371    229371 229371 156450 159112 224419 229371    229371 
D(age>=47)  0.88   0.21   -0.047   0.0020  -0.35   -0.69   -0.10   0.0041   0.00014 
 [0.067]**  [0.13]    [0.073]  [0.0035]  [0.34]   [0.39]   [0.30]   [0.0041]   [0.0019] 
Elasticity   0.50   0.068   -0.15   0.012   0.097   -0.065   -0.0070  0.066   0.016  
Observations  221798    221798    221798 221798 146379 148860 216839 221798    221798 
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of cut-
off. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).  
  †The 1997 reform only came in to full effect for the workers in the high experience sample in April 
of 1999. The sample for this table consists therefore of individuals starting unemployment spells 
between April 1999 and December 2004, who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years with-
out intermittent UI spell.  
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of potential UI durations by gender 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  



















Panel A: Men Only 
D(age>=42)  1.53   0.72   0.052   -0.0070  -0.31   -0.13   0.34   0.00018   0.0050  
  [0.056]**   [0.13]**   [0.059]   [0.0031]* [0.29]   [0.33]   [0.28]   [0.0046]   [0.0035] 
Elasticity   0.55   0.13   0.084   -0.020   0.062   -0.0045  0.010   0.000830   0.079  
Observations  194804   194804   194804  194804  164805  168350  190071   194804   194804 
D(age>=44)  0.84   0.36   0.074   -0.0042  -0.032   -0.44   -0.44   0.00050   0.0019  
  [0.0707]**  [0.14]**   [0.049]   [0.0033]  [0.29]   [0.33]   [0.29]   [0.00480]   [0.0038] 
Elasticity   0.45   0.12   0.26   -0.024   0.013   -0.031   -0.026   0.00470   0.056  
Observations  190696   190696   190696  190696  158606  161993  185900   190696   190696 
D(age>=49)  1.05   0.19   0.0058   -0.0051  -0.21   -0.34   -0.0065   -0.0054   0.011  
  [0.13]**   [0.19]   [0.073]   [0.0051]  [0.43]   [0.47]   [0.39]   [0.0063]   [0.0052]*
Elasticity   0.59   0.065   0.022   -0.038   0.082   -0.030   -0.00045   -0.070   0.32  
Observations  131852   131852   131852  131852  102437  104815  127882   131852   131852 
Panel B: Women Only 
D(age>=42)  2.13   0.98   -0.20   -0.0048  -0.58   -0.37   0.32   -0.010   0.0071  
  [0.080]**   [0.18]**   [0.096]*  [0.0042]  [0.38]   [0.40]   [0.38]   [0.0065]   [0.0044] 
Elasticity   0.62   0.15   -0.31   -0.014   0.11   -0.019   0.013   -0.043   0.16  
Observations  103513   103513   103513  103513  88024   90044   100761   103513   103513 
D(age>=44)  1.26   0.39   -0.065   -0.0024  0.12   0.54   0.38   -0.0094   0.0080  
  [0.099]**   [0.17]*   [0.090]   [0.0046]  [0.37]   [0.36]   [0.37]   [0.0064]   [0.0044] 
Elasticity   0.58   0.11   -0.22   -0.014   -0.042   0.058   0.030   -0.083   0.32  
Observations  106500   106500   106500  106500  88565   90520   103729   106500   106500 
D(age>=49)  1.62   0.46   0.087   -0.0077  -0.96   -0.84   0.11   0.00062   0.0026  
  [0.18]**   [0.26]   [0.091]   [0.0079]  [0.52]   [0.50]   [0.46]   [0.0093]   [0.0070] 
Elasticity   0.70   0.13   0.39   -0.059   0.33   -0.12   0.011   0.0080   0.103  
Observations  76742   76742   76742   76742   58844   60142   74561   76742   76742  
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of cut-off. 
Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01).  
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987 and March 1999, 
who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. Observations within 
1 month of discontinuity are excluded. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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The correlation of labour supply elasticities from regression discontinuity  
estimates with the economic environment 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  








The effect of labour market conditions on duration elasticity 
Unemployment Rate
†   -0.00096        
 [0.013]         
Change in Unemployment Rate
†     0.061      
   [1.96]       
Plant Closing Rate
†       -0.12    
     [0.097]     
Mass Layoff Rate
†         -0.050  
       [0.031]   
Constant   0.12   0.12   0.12   0.12  
 [0.016]**  [0.016]**  [0.016]**  [0.015]** 
Root MSE   0.11   0.11   0.11   0.10  
Observations   47   47   47   47  
The effect of turbulence on duration elasticity (within years) 
1st Quintile of Log Wage Losses   -0.013     -0.014    
(Ind-Year cell) - highest losses   [0.052]     [0.052]    
2nd Quintile of Log Wage Losses   0.0049     0.0040    
(Ind-Year cell)   [0.053]     [0.052]    
3rd Quintile of Log Wage Losses   0.034     0.034    
(Ind-Year cell)   [0.053]     [0.052]    
4th Quintile of Log Wage Losses   0.013     0.012    
(Ind-Year cell)   [0.052]     [0.052]    
5th Quintile of Log Wage Losses   Omitted     Omitted    
(Ind-Year cell) - lowest losses   Category     Category    
Average Log Wage Loss     0.20     0.090  
in Year-Quantile Cell
†     [0.15]     [0.17]  
Change in Unemployment Rate
†   0.11   -0.24      
  [2.16]   [2.16]      
Unemployment Rate
†   -0.0062   -0.0010      
  [0.014]   [0.014]      
Controlling for Year Fixed Effects  No   No   Yes   Yes  
Constant   0.11   0.12   0.12   0.12  
  [0.037]**  [0.017]**  [0.095]   [0.089]  
Root MSE   0.25   0.25   0.25   0.25  
Observations   235   235   235   235  
Notes:   * P<.05, ** P<.01, Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions of estimated labour  
supply elasticities (one elasticity for each year and age discontinuity - 42, 44, and  
49 for the earlier period and 45 and 47 for the later period). Regressions weighted  
by Precision of Elasticity Estimate (Inverse of Standard error of elasticity). 
  † Variable is demeaned, so that the constant in the regression is an estimate of the  
mean elasticity (top panel) or of the elasticity in the omitted group (bottom panel,  
columns 1 and 3). 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of potential UI durations  
on non-employment durations by subgroups 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 D(age>=42)  D(age>=44)  D(age>=49) 
Declining unemployment (1987-1991) 
Marginal Effect in Months  1.29   0.50   0.23  
  [0.26]**   [0.26]   [0.33]  
Elasticity   0.22   0.17   0.081  
Observations   57893   55610   49096  
Rising unemployment (1992-1997) 
Marginal Effect in Months  0.69   0.28   0.48  
  [0.14]**   [0.14]*   [0.20]*  
Elasticity   0.11   0.084   0.15  
Observations   185491   187186   121482  
Tenure <= 5 years 
Marginal Effect in Months  0.65   0.25   0.085  
  [0.15]**   [0.16]   [0.23]  
Elasticity   0.12   0.085   0.031  
Observations   153173   148791   93289  
Tenure > 5 years 
Marginal Effect in Months  1.01   0.50   0.56  
  [0.17]**   [0.16]**   [0.21]**  
Elasticity   0.16   0.15   0.17  
Observations   145144   148405   115305  
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on  
each side of cut-off. Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01). 
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987  
and March 1999, who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without inter- 
mittent UI spell. Observations within 1 month of discontinuity are excluded. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of potential UI durations on post unem-
ployment match quality 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)  




















Panel A: All observations 
D(age>=42)  0.37   -0.22   -0.0074  -0.54   -0.013   -0.0059  -0.0057   0.0061   0.011  
  [0.23]   [0.24]   [0.0055]  [0.21]**  [0.0051]** [0.0063] [0.0053]   [0.0037]  [0.0040]**
Observations  303446  269650   269650   263824  263824   175263  175093   264438   273476  
D(age>=44)  -0.024   0.0053   -0.00031 -0.042   -0.0011 -0.0040  -0.012   0.0038   0.0051  
  [0.22]   [0.24]   [0.0057]  [0.21]   [0.0053] [0.0066] [0.0052]*   [0.0036]  [0.0038] 
Observations  302272  263538   263538   257982  257982   168274  168114   258186   267392  
D(age>=49)  0.051   -0.96   -0.020   -0.83   -0.019   -0.015   0.013   0.0090   0.0058  
 [0.29]    [0.32]**  [0.0083]* [0.30]** [0.0078]* [0.010]   [0.0076]   [0.0048]  [0.0050] 
Observations  214311  174522   174522   170611  170611   105651  105544   170743   177174  
Panel B: Excluding observations within 1 month of discontinuity 
D(age>=42)  0.20   -0.35   -0.0093  -0.41   -0.010   -0.0052 -0.0051   0.0048   0.0079  
  [0.24]   [0.27]   [0.0061]  [0.23]   [0.0055] [0.0069] [0.0057]   [0.0039]  [0.0042] 
Observations  290832  258394   258394   252829  252829   167936  167775   253429   262067  
D(age>=44)  -0.21   -0.12   -0.0019  0.019  -0.00096 -0.011    -0.013   0.0042   0.0042  
  [0.24]   [0.27]   [0.0063]  [0.23]   [0.0057] [0.0071] [0.0056]*   [0.0040]  [0.0042] 
Observations  289629  252513   252513   247171  247171   161243  161094   247392   256196  
D(age>=49)  -0.28   -0.83   -0.017   -0.50   -0.012   -0.014   0.014   0.0043   0.0037  
  [0.35]   [0.39]*   [0.0099]  [0.35]   [0.0091] [0.012]    [0.0092]   [0.0057]  [0.0058] 
Observations  202443  164957   164957   161281  161281   99878   99773   161378   167458  
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of cut-off. 
Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01). 
  The sample consists of individuals starting unemployment spells between July 1987 and March 1999, 
who had worked for 52 months in the last 7 years without intermittent UI spell. Observations within 1 
month of discontinuity are excluded.  
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Regression discontinuity estimates of potential UI durations on escape hazards 
and accepted wages during different periods of the unemployment spell 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)  
  Month 0-11  Month 12  Month 13-17 Month 18  Month 19-21 Month 22   Month 23-36
Panel A: Exit Hazards 
D(age>=42)  -0.031   -0.024   -0.0054   0.013   0.0035   0.0041   0.0050  
  [0.0037]**   [0.0025]**  [0.0041]   [0.0023]** [0.0034]   [0.0021]   [0.0052]  
Observations  311252   140609   132866   110560   106235   97280   94763  
D(age>=44)  -0.012   -0.0020   -0.014   -0.013   -0.0060   0.013   0.0054  
  [0.0036]**   [0.0020]   [0.0040]**  [0.0022]** [0.0032]    [0.0022]** [0.0054]   
Observations  310140   148755   142709   120474   115964   106077   102679  
D(age>=49)  -0.014   0.0037   0.0048   -0.0043   -0.0100   -0.015   0.015  
  [0.0046]**   [0.0022]   [0.0042]   [0.0020]*   [0.0029]**  [0.0023]** [0.0061]*   
Observations  220837   118696   114844   100241   97611   90648   87853  
Panel B: Post Unemployment Wage in Euro 
D(age>=42)  0.24   4.68   1.82   -4.41   0.17   -2.46   0.021  
  [0.28]   [1.47]**   [0.81]*   [2.03]*   [1.34]   [2.37]   [0.86]  
Observations  170567   7872   22321   4412   8994   2556   22111  
D(age>=44)  0.42   -0.65   0.50   1.92   -1.29   -2.22   1.05  
  [0.27]   [1.58]   [0.82]   [1.78]   [1.19]   [1.96]   [0.76]  
Observations  161261   6144   22252   4588   9939   3438   24127  
D(age>=49)  -0.80   0.75   -1.54   3.15   -2.31   -0.084   -0.91  
  [0.36]*   [2.13]   [1.08]   [2.65]   [1.52]   [2.60]   [0.97]  
Observations  101997   3908   14598   2667   7008   2831   18896  
Panel C: Log Wage Loss 
D(age>=42)  -0.00053   0.061   0.024   -0.094   0.0096   0.027   0.032  
  [0.0044]   [0.028]*   [0.017]   [0.040]*   [0.029]   [0.057]   [0.022]  
Observations  167870   7721   21788   4295   8758   2452   21388  
D(age>=44)  0.0091   0.046   0.018   0.045   -0.037   -0.021   0.033  
  [0.0046]*   [0.033]   [0.017]   [0.042]   [0.027]   [0.049]   [0.021]  
Observations  158784   6031   21740   4463   9687   3339   23378  
D(age>=49)  -0.0042   0.0026   -0.028   0.036   -0.065   0.036   -0.041  
  [0.0064]   [0.045]   [0.025]   [0.062]   [0.038]   [0.070]   [0.028]  
Observations  100322   3833   14287   2599   6825   2752   18318  
Notes:   Coefficients from RD regressions. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of cut-off. 
Standard errors clustered on day level (* P<.05, ** P<.01). For sample definition see Table 2. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Potential UI durations by period (Workers in highest experience category) 
 
Note:  The figure shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) durations for workers in the highest 
experience group vary with age and over time. For details on the required experience to be eligible 
for the maximum durations see Table 1. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Actual unemployment insurance benefit (ALG) durations and non-employment 
durations by age – period 1987 to 1999 
 
Note:  The top figure shows average durations of receiving UI benefits by age at the start of receiving 
unemployment insurance. The bottom figures shows average non-employment durations for 
these workers, where non-employment duration is measured as the time until return to a job and 
is capped at 36 months. Each dot corresponds to an average over 120 days. The vertical lines 
mark age cut-offs for increases in potential UI durations at age 42 (12 to 18 months), 44 (18 to 
22 months) and 49 (22 to 26 months). The sample consists of unemployed worker claiming UI 
between July 1987 and March 1999 who had worked for at least 5 out of the last 7 years (and did 
not receive UI benefits in that time). 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Density around age cut-offs for potential UI durations – period 1987 to 1999 
 
Note:  The top figure shows density of spells by age at the start of receiving unemployment insurance 
(i.e. the number of spells in 2 week interval age bins). The bottom figures shows the density by 
age at the end of the last job before the UI spell. The vertical lines mark age cut-offs for in-
creases in potential UI durations at age 42 (12 to 18 months), 44 (18 to 22 months) and 49 (22 to 
26 months). The sample consist of unemployed worker who had worked for at least 5 out of the 
last 7 years (and did not receive UI benefits in that time). Sample period: July 1987 – April 1999. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Actual unemployment insurance benefit (ALG) durations and non-employment 
durations by age – post 1997 reform 
 
Note:  The top figure shows average durations of receiving UI benefits by age at the start of receiving 
unemployment insurance. The bottom figures shows average non-employment durations for 
these workers, where non-employment duration is measured as the time until return to a job and 
is capped at 36 months. Each dot corresponds to an average over 120 days. The vertical lines 
mark age cut-offs for increases in potential UI durations at age 45 (12 to 18 months) and 47 (18 
to 22 months). The sample consist of unemployed worker claiming UI between April 1999 and 
December 2004 who had worked for at least 5 out of the last 7 years (and did not receive UI 
benefits in that time). 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Variation in regression discontinuity estimates of non-employment duration 
elasticities with respect to potential UI duration over time and with economic 
environment 
 
Note:  Each dot in the bottom figure corresponds to a non-unemployment duration elasticity estimated 
at an age cut-off in one year between 1987 and 2004 at any of the available cut-offs (42, 44, 45, 
47, and 49). The horizontal line in the bottom figure is the regression line from the regression of 
elasticity’s on the employment rate. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Future employment status and post unemployment wages by age 
 
Note:  For sample description see Figure 2. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Effect of increasing potential UI durations from 12 to 18 months on the survival 
functions – Regression discontinuity estimate at age 42 discontinuity 
 
Note:  The survival functions in both figures are estimated pointwise at each point of support using 
regression discontinuity estimation. For details see text. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Effect of increasing potential UI durations from 12 to 18 months on the hazard 
functions – Regression discontinuity estimate at age 42 discontinuity 
 
Note:  The hazard functions in both figures are estimated pointwise at each point of support using 
regression discontinuity estimation. Vertical bars indicate that the hazard rates are statistically 
significant from each other on the 5 percent level. For details see text. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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The decline of wages with the duration of non-employment 
 
Note:  The figure shows the average wage loss of individuals exiting UI conditional on the month of exit 
for different age groups (that were eligible to different UI durations). 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Mean accepted wage by unemployment duration for workers with 12 and 
18 month of UI eligibility 
 
Note:  The top figures shows the average log wage loss in Euro of individuals accepting jobs condi-
tional on the month of exit (since the start of UI) for workers eligible for 12 months of UI benefits 
(the control group) and 18 months of UI benefits (the treatment group). The difference between 
the two functions is estimated using regression discontinuity at each point of support around the 
age 42 cut-offs. The bottom figure uses the same principle but shows wage losses by quantiles 
(in 5 percent intervals) of the respective duration distribution below and above the eligibility cut-
off. Vertical bars between the lines indicate statistical significance on the 5 percent level. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Figure A-1 
Density around cut-offs Period: 1999 – 2004 
 
Note:  The top figure shows density of spells by age at the start of receiving unemployment insurance 
(i.e. the number of spells in 2 week interval age bins). The bottom figure shows the density by 
age at the end of the last job before the UI spell. The vertical lines mark age cut-offs for in-
creases in potential UI durations at age 45 (12 to 18 months) and 47 (18 to 22 months). The 
sample consists of unemployed worker who had worked for at least 6 out of the last 7 years 
(and did not receive UI benefits in that time). 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Baseline characteristics around age discontinuities 
 
Note:  For sample description see Figure 1. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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Effect of increasing potential UI durations from 12 to 18 month on the weekly 
hazard functions – Regression discontinuity estimate at age 42 discontinuity 
 
Note:  The hazard functions in both figures are estimated pointwise at each point of support using 
regression discontinuity estimation. Vertical bars indicate that the hazard rates are statistically 
significant from each other on the 5 percent level. For details see text. 
Source:  Authors’ own calculations based on BLH. 
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